DRAFT: This module has unpublished changes.

Complexity As A Risk Factor - The Seattle Tunnel Crane Accident

 

            In mulitple cases, the complexity of an operating system or machine can play as a huge risk factor when understanding what is involved with making it work. Between where the system is operating and what is lying around the system can determine the risk and outcome if it was to fail. To exemplify this concept, the Seattle Tunnel Crane Accident could be said to be a very complex system that became a risk factor. The two hundred thousand pound crane was being used to lift a large steel structure 80 feet above ground over many workers. Then it began to tip due to many underminded reasons. Ultimately, some of the miscalculations and misinterpretations of measurments such as the load moment indicator and the weight of the load played significant parts in why the system failed. In discussing the load moment indicator, it is important to understand that if the engineers had never looked over this componenet, the accident would have never occured. Although the load is not part of the machine at hand, cutting corners and not measuring the load to the base of the crane caused serious issues to occur during the project. Infact, many believe that if the base of the crane was stronger and had more weight to it, the force would have been balanced and would have kept the crane sturdy as it would function properly. As discussed by Dekker in the readings, he explains how each part of a system does not understand the effects of its action and is infact "ignorant of its behavior". In understanding this accident as it incorporates Dekker's annalysis, components of the crane such as the load moment indicator and weight of the must be seriously taken into consideration. Both of these components are "ignorant" in their behaviors however they can cause devistation if they are not measured properly.

We must also take into consideration the enviorment of the system. In this case, the Seattle Tunnel Crane was working outdoors high above the ground over many workers. This drastically increases the risk of the situtation in the fact that dropping a heavy piece of steel from that height could end lives very quick. The workers put themselves at risk by not taking into consideration the enviorment and structure of the crane when it came down to having it lift heavy material. Although the enviorment of the structure created more of a risk factor in the incident, it also helped prevent deaths when the crane hit a conveyor belt close by that haulted the collapse. Having been called a blessing in disguise, it is still important to create a safe and strong enviorment when it comes down to the complexity of a system. Ultimatelty the Seattle Tunnel Crane Accident is a great learning experience for engineers when it comes down to working in the field of cranes and developing them. It is crucial to never cut corners in a given project and understand every single function and component in the system. Essentially, these measurements could save lots of money and many lives. 

 

"Normalization of Deviance"

 

            The normalization of Deviance is when someone cuts corners in a given project to complete a task and thinks its acceptable when nothing is going wrong because of the lack of consequences until a disaster occurs. It can also be described as an unnacceptable behavior becoming acceptable when nothing had occured in the past during a project. Essentially, this term is one of the main causes of an increase in the risk of failure because the designers and engineers of projects become unprepared for a disaster to occur when they over look the steps that need to be taken in order to complete a project. This could be easily represented in the explosion of the Challenger Shuttle in the 1980s when limits were pushed too far and safety precautions were ignored when it came to testing o-ring gaskets. After being tested in poor conditions, many of the scientists in NASA agreed that it would be okay to take place. However, this time the test did not succeed. Ultimately, it is important to never feel comfortable when certain steps have been skipped in designing a system. We must understand the importance of preventing the normalization deviance by ecknowledging all precautions of a given system and overcoming them even if you feel like it is unecassary. As state previously, these steps could potentially save the system or save someones life. 

 

Reflection

 

Ultimately, this assignment helped me further understand the complexity of systems and how to never over look any components and the enviorments these systems function in. As i enter the workforce after college, i can use this lesson in almost anything i do even if it does not have to do with engineering. This is essentially a good work ethic to understand and it could possibly be used anywhere.

 

References

 

http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/explode.html

http://www.king5.com/story/news/local/investigations/2015/04/16/seattle-tunnel-project-crane-accident-august-2014/25909619/

 

DRAFT: This module has unpublished changes.